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Government Surveillance Accountability: The
Failures of Contemporary Canadian Interception
Reports
Christopher Parsons* and Adam Molnar**
Abstract
Real time electronic government surveillance is recognized as amongst the most
intrusive types of government activity upon private citizens’ lives. There are usually
stringent warranting practices that must be met prior to law enforcement or security
agencies engaging in such domestic surveillance. In Canada, federal and provincial
governments must report annually on these practices when they are conducted by
law enforcement or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, disclosing how often
such warrants are sought and granted, the types of crimes such surveillance is
directed towards, and the efficacy of such surveillance in being used as evidence and
securing convictions.
This article draws on an empirical examination of federal and provincial
electronic surveillance reports in Canada to examine the usefulness of Canadian
governments’ annual electronic surveillance reports for legislators and external
stakeholders alike to hold the government to account. It explores whether there are
primary gaps in accountability, such as where there are no legislative requirements
to produce records to legislators or external stakeholders. It also examines the
extent to which secondary gaps exist, such as where there is a failure of legislative
compliance or ambiguity related to that compliance.
We find that extensive secondary gaps undermine legislators’ abilities to hold
government to account and weaken capacities for external stakeholders to
understand and demand justification for government surveillance activities. In
particular, these gaps arise from the failure to annually table reports, in divergent
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formatting of reports between jurisdictions, and in the deficient narrative
explanations accompanying the tabled electronic surveillance reports. The chronic
nature of these gaps leads us to argue that there are policy failures emergent from
the discretion granted to government Ministers and failures to deliberately establish
conditions that would ensure governmental accountability. Unless these deficiencies
are corrected, accountability reporting as a public policy instrument threatens to
advance a veneer of political legitimacy at the expense of maintaining fulsome
democratic safeguards to secure the freedoms associated with liberal democratic
political systems. We ultimately make a series of policy proposals which, if adopted,
should ensure that government accountability reporting is both substantial and
effective as a policy instrument to monitor and review the efficacy of real-time
electronic surveillance in Canada.

INTRODUCTION
Government agencies have conducted telecommunications surveillance since
the inception of the telegraph, and each new means of communication has been
accompanied by new surveillance capabilities. 1 Following concerns in the 1960s
and 1970s about the computerization of personal information and new kinds of
electronic surveillance methods the Government of Canada passed the Protection
of Privacy Act.2 The Act, amongst other things, required federal and provincial
governments to present annual reports that detailed the number of electronic
surveillance requests and approvals, how they were carried out, and their utility
in securing convictions against alleged criminal offenders. The Act was amended
in 1977 to ‘‘require [law enforcement agencies] to provide notification to
investigative subjects within 90 days of the date upon which the authorization
was issued and to comply with strict court restrictions on how, what, and where
suspects may be monitored.”3 The intended effects of these reports (along with
notification requirements) were to publicize how often government agencies used
their interception powers which, in turn, would make them more accountable to
their respective legislative assemblies.
Previous scholars have examined the extent to which electronic surveillance
reports accurately account for government surveillance activities and the extent
to which they enable legislators to meaningfully hold agencies accountable for
intrusions into private citizens’ lives. Kennedy and Swire found differences
between how American federal and state agencies obtain interception orders and
1

2
3

Serena Chan & L. Jean Camp, ‘‘Law Enforcement Surveillance in the Network Society”,
IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 21:2 (2002); Susan Landau, Surveillance or
Security?: The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (London: MIT Press, 2010)
[Landau, Surveillance or Security?]; Stanley M. Beck, ‘‘Electronic Surveillance and the
Administration of Criminal Justice” (1968) 46:4 Can Bar Rev 643.
Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
Nicholas Koutros and Julien Demers, ‘‘Big Brother’s Shadow: Decline in Reported Use
of Electronic Surveillance by Canadian Federal Law Enforcement” (2013) 11:1 CJLT 79
[Koutros and Demers, ‘‘Big Brother’s Shadow”].
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were held to account for their operation.4 Nuun examined the extent to which
American interception orders were used to secure arrests and convictions, finding
that the ‘‘productivity” of interception orders varied considerably based on
whether interceptions were used to arrest suspects or to secure convictions. 5
Koutros and Demers examined Canadian federal government interception
reports and found that there had been a decline in the annual number of reported
federal wiretaps.6 Other work has examined the extent to which existing
surveillance reporting in Canada and the United States inadequately accounts for
contemporary modes of government surveillance techniques and proposes ways
of correcting existing reporting mechanisms.7
To date, however, no research has systematically examined Canadian federal
and provincial/territorial statutory electronic surveillance reports to determine
whether they promote accountability between the government and legislature,
and the government and public more broadly. This article finds deficiencies in
how governments tabulate data for these reports, as well as in how governments
present the information to legislative assemblies and the public, leading to
accountability gaps concerning how governments report on electronic
surveillance. Existing limitations of statutory surveillance reporting
requirements call into question the efficacy of civil society and scholarly
proposals to expand surveillance accountability by adopting templates that are
currently used for electronic surveillance reports.
4

5

6
7

Charles H. Kennedy and Peter P. Swire, ‘‘State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveillance
After September 11” (2003) 54:4 Hastings LJ 971.
Samuel Nunn, ‘‘Measuring Criminal Justice Technology Outputs: The Case of Title III
Wiretap Productivity” (2008) 36:4 Journal of Criminal Justice 293.
Koutros and Demers, ‘‘Big Brother’s Shadow”, supra note 3.
Christopher Parsons, ‘‘The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance: How
Opaque and Unaccountable Practices and Policies Threaten Canadians”, Citizen Lab
(2015), online: <http://www.telecomtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
Governance-of-Telecommunications-Surveillance-Final.pdf> [Parsons, ‘‘The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance”]; Christopher Soghoian, ‘‘The Law Enforcement Surveillance Reporting Gap”, online: (2011) SSRN Electronic Journal <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806628> [Soghoian, ‘‘Surveillance
Reporting Gap”]; Paul M. Schwartz, ‘‘Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance
Law” (2008) 75:1 U Chicago L Rev 287 [Schwartz, ‘‘Reviving Telecommunications”];
Devon Ombres, ‘‘NSA Domestic Surveillance from the Patriot Act to the Freedom Act:
The Underlying History, Constitutional Basis, and the Efforts at Reform” (2015) 39:1
Seton Hall Legis J 27; Tyler C. Anderson, ‘‘Toward Institutional Reform of Intelligence
Surveillance: A Proposal to Amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” (2014) 8
Harvard Law & Policy Review 413; Craig Forcese, ‘‘Law, Logarithms and Liberties:
Legal Issues Arising from CSE’s Metadata Collection Initiatives” in Michael Geist, ed.,
Law, Privacy and Surveillance in Canada in the Post-Snowden Era (Ottawa: University of
Ottawa Press, 2015) at 103; James Losey, ‘‘Surveillance of Communications: A
Legitimation Crisis and the Need for Transparency” (2015) 9 International Journal of
Communications 3450; Andrew Clement & Jonathan Obar, ‘‘Keeping Internet Users in
the Know or in the Dark” (2016) 6:1 Journal of Information Policy 294, online: <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996173>.
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Part I introduces a two-part conceptual framework for better understanding
government accountability in the context of electronic surveillance. First, we
discuss how ‘‘vertical” accountability between different government institutions
and branches of government enable or constrain possibilities for the legislature to
hold the government to account. Second, we explore how ‘‘horizontal”
accountability between government institutions and the public strengthen
public engagement into government policy, which fosters relationships that can
promote trust and accountability in government activities. Third, we link vertical
and horizontal accountability to annual electronic surveillance reports in Canada
and discuss the value of these modes of accountability to monitor government
interference into private life.
Part II discusses how interception reports for Canadian jurisdictions were
collected and how data was collated for analysis. Part III discusses the major
findings from the data, namely, deficiencies associated with the tabling,
accessibility, and formatting of annual electronic surveillance reports. Part IV
critically assesses whether the analyzed interception reports successfully promote
governments’ accountability to legislative assemblies and the public. Part V
summarizes our argument and identifies areas of future work.

I. ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMIZATION
Legislators in democratic countries have created mechanisms to promote the
accountability of public officials towards citizens. Such mechanisms are intended
to impose binding rules on the powers and authority of public officials to ensure
accountability.8 Accountability exists ‘‘when there is a relationship where an
individual or institution, and the performance of tasks or functions by that
individual or institution, are subject to another’s oversight, direction or request
that the individual or institution provide information of justification for its
actions.”9 As such, an institution must both be obligated to answer questions
regarding its decisions or actions and there must be a means for enforcing
consequences for failing to be accountable.10

8

9

10

David Brinkerhoff, ‘‘Taking Account of Accountability: A Conceptual Overview and
Strategic Options”, US Agency for International Development Center for Democracy and
Governance Implementing Policy Change Project Phase 2 (Washington, D.C.: March
2001), online: <http://www.msiworldwide.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/IPC_Taking_Account_of_Accountability.pdf >.
Riccardo Pelizzo & Frederick Stapenhurst, Government Accountability and Legislative
Oversight (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 2.
Andreas Schedler, ‘‘Conceptualizing Accountability” in Andreas Schedler, Larry
Diamond & Marc Plattner, eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability
in New Democracies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 13; Andrew Blick & Edward
Hedger, ‘‘Literature Review of Factors Contributing to Commonwealth Public
Accounts Committees Effectively Holding Government to Account for the Use of
Public Resources”, Overseas Development Institute (2008).
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The accountability literature in political science and public policy has often
focused on a hierarchical model, such as the responsibility of Ministers or
members of the executive to their respective legislative bodies. This model
involves an actor that is accountable to a forum, for particular activities or
actions, where the forum could discipline the actor should they fall short of
expected activities or actions.11 As discussed by Mulgan, an extensive literature
has developed to critique, supplement, or contextualize this traditional
approach.12 Accountability is sometimes now understood as establishing
unnecessary adversarial processes,13 as a concept needing to take on board
how actors are sanctioned by their professional organizations,14 as addressing
how institutions control official behaviours through internal organizational
processes,15 as concerning how officials are accountable to the public directly 16
and to legislators through parliamentary appearances,17 and how democratic
dialogue disciplines institutions.18 These changes to how accountability is
conceptualized are based, in part, on the fact that private actors now assume
roles and responsibilities that were carried out solely under the authority of state
agencies.19

(a) Vertical and Horizontal Accountability
An open debate exists about whether the extensions of the concept of
accountability are ‘‘more the creations of academics pursuing their own
intellectual agendas” as opposed to ‘‘the result of shifts in everyday usage” of
the term within government.20 For this article, we examine accountability
11

12

13
14

15

16

17

18

19
20

Richard Mulgan, ‘‘The Processes of Public Accountability” (1997) 56:1 Australian
Journal of Public Accountability 25; Jonathan Anderson, ‘‘Illusions of Accountability:
Credit and Blame Sensemaking in Public Administration” (2009) 31:3 Administrative
Theory & Praxis 322 [Anderson, ‘‘Illusions of Accountability”].
Richard Mulgan, ‘‘‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?” (2000) 78:3 Public
Administration 555 [Mulgan, ‘‘Accountability”].
Anderson, ‘‘Illusions of Accountability”, supra note 11.
Linda Deleon, ‘‘Accountability in A ‘Reinvented’ Government” (1998) 76:3 Public
Administration 539.
Amanda Sinclair, ‘‘The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses” (1995)
20:2-3 Accounting, Organizations and Society 219; David C. Corbett, Australian Public
Sector Management, 2nd ed. (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996).
Owen E. Hughes, Public Management and Administration, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan,
1998).
Bruce Stone, ‘‘Administrative Accountability in the ‘Westminster’ Democracies:
Towards a New Conceptual Framework” (1995) 8:4 Governance 505 [Stone, ‘‘Administrative Accountability”].
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press,
1995).
Colin Scott, ‘‘Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 27:1 JL & Soc’y 38.
Mulgan, ‘‘Accountability”, supra note 12 at 571.
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exclusively through two lenses. First, through the lens of parliamentary Ministers
being formally compelled to account for their departments’ activities to
legislative assemblies.21 Second, through the lens of informal accountability
measures which arise as public and policy communities hold government to
account based upon the information publicly provided to legislatures.22
Ministerial reporting is characterized as being ‘‘vertical” because it takes
place in a formal context involving a relationship between an actor (the Minister)
and a forum (the legislature), where the actor is obligated to explain and justify
their actions, and the forum is empowered to receive the explanation and
justification, as well as to issue sanctions as needed. This type of accountability
includes agreements between the actor and forum about which explanations are
owed, the terms according to which the explanations are to be provided, and the
consequences that might follow.23 Our focus is on the extent to which processes
and policies associated with Ministerial accountability operate when actually put
into practice.
Informal reporting, in contrast, is referred to as ‘‘horizontal accountability”
and is characterized as building accountability through civil engagement. This
mode of accountability is meant to complement and enhance government
accountability processes.24 The parties involved in horizontal accountability lack
a direct ability to impose sanction or exercise coercion and there is no formal
requirement for an actor to provide an account to that forum.25 Instead,
horizontal accountability involves an actor voluntarily choosing to present
information to a forum and receiving feedback or facing moral suasion based on
the forum’s evaluation of the presented information. If the media amplifies these
debates, horizontal processes of accountability through civic engagement may be
strengthened.26
Regimes of government accountability are designed to monitor and control
government conduct. Such control is enforced during a government’s tenure in
office by the legislature and, during the electoral period, by ‘‘citizens, who pass
judgement on the conduct of the government and who indicate their displeasure
21

22

23

24
25

26

Dale Smith, The Unbroken Machine: Canada’s Democracy in Action (Toronto: Dundurn,
2017); Bruce Stone, ‘‘Administrative Accountability”, supra note 17.
Carmen Malena et al., ‘‘Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and
Emerging Practice” (2004) The World Bank Working Paper No. 31042 at 76 [Malena et
al., ‘‘Social Accountability”].
Deborah G. Johnson, ‘‘Accountability in a House of Mirrors” in Deborah G. Johnson &
Priscilla M. Regan, eds., Transparency and Surveillance as Sociotechnical Accountability:
A House of Mirrors (New York: Routledge, 2014) 131 at 136 [Johnson, ‘‘Accountability
in a House of Mirrors”].
Malena et al., ‘‘Social Accountability”, supra note 22 at 76.
Mark Bovens, ‘‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework”
(2007) 13:4 Eur LJ 447 [Bovens, ‘‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability”].
Malena et al., ‘‘Social Accountability”, supra note 22 at 76; Maxwell McCombs, Setting
the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion (Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons, 2014).
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by voting for other popular representatives.”27 Where a legislature is slow or
deficient in holding the government to account, then processes of accountability
can be assisted by measures of horizontal accountability. Horizontal
accountability practices can help to identify problems in government as
external stakeholders evaluate government practices so that legislators can
subsequently raise the problems (and possible solutions) with government.
External experts can also be called to testify before committees or provide direct
briefings to specific legislators or government departments. However, to be
effective, those external to government require access to information and
capacity to take on horizontal accountability tasks. There must also be state
willingness and capacity to implement changes proposed by civil society, and
active and meaningful interfaces between civil society and the state. 28 Absent
these characteristics, external stakeholders will lack the material they need to
hold the government to account, and legislators will lack required resources to
effect change when issues are brought onto the policy agenda.

(b) Accountability Gaps
Accountability gaps can arise between actors and the forums to which they
are responsible when ‘‘reviewers or overseers do not have adequate powers or
resources to match the conduct that is being reviewed.”29 There may be either
primary or secondary-types of accountability gaps. Primary gaps arise when
there are no legislative requirements to produce government data, which is itself
required to exercise accountability functions in the first place. Such primary gaps
stymie both vertical and horizontal accountability. Secondary gaps arise when
legislative requirements compel a certain degree of government accountability
but the required information is either not provided or there are insufficient
resources or capacity to analyze the data in question. For example, when a forum
lacks expertise or capacity to understand the information provided by an actor
they may be unaware that sanctions constitute an appropriate response. A lack
of capacity can also be linked to an absence of long-serving legislators who have
developed subject matter expertise concerning the actor’s activities or obligations
or to limits in external stakeholders’ attention to the reporting or ability to act on
disclosed information.30 Another example of a secondary gap might emerge
when the information that is provided by the actor may be sufficiently unclear
27
28
29

30

Bovens, ‘‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability”, supra note 25 at 463.
Malena et al., ‘‘Social Accountability”, supra note 22 at 76.
Kent Roach, ‘‘Permanent Accountability Gaps and Partial Remedies” in Michael Geist,
ed., Law, Privacy and Surveillance in Canada in the Post-Snowden Era (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 2015) 163 at 169.
Rod B. Byers, ‘‘Perceptions of Parliamentary Surveillance of the Executive: The Case of
Canadian Defence Policy” (1972) 5:2 Canadian Journal of Political Science 234; Brent
Rathgeber, Irresponsible Government: The Decline of Parliamentary Democracy in
Canada (Toronto: Dundurn, 2014); Malena et al., ‘‘Social Accountability”, supra note 22
at 76; Johnson, ‘‘Accountability in a House of Mirrors”, supra note 23 at 136.
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that the forum cannot interpret what is provided.31 Accountability gaps run the
risk of turning into accountability failures when either primary or secondary
gaps become the norm, as opposed to the exception.
Accountability gaps pose dangers to democratic governance. On the one
hand, if elected representatives do not, or cannot, hold government to account,
then there is a breakdown in the representative democratic system insofar as the
electorate’s intentions of being well represented are not met.32 Breakdown can
prompt cynicism or doubt concerning legislators’ competency in representing the
electorate and, as such, inhibit electors from seeing themselves in the actions of
legislators.33 Moreover, accountability serves to ‘‘help to ensure the legitimacy of
governance remains intact or is increased” by providing administrators ‘‘the
opportunity to explain and justify their intentions” and enabling citizens and
interest groups to ‘‘pose questions and offer their opinion”. Such questioning, or
horizontal accountability, ‘‘can promote acceptance of government authority
and the citizens’ confidence in the government’s administration.”34 Thus, a
failure by government to meet its obligations to disclose information can
diminish the democratic bonds between citizens and their government and
weaken the faith that lawful activities are undertaken with the approval, or
democratic consent, of the citizenry.35

(c) Government Surveillance Accountability
Real-time government electronic surveillance can take many forms, including
recording audio or visual activities, intercepting communications, or planting
surveillance equipment in individuals’ homes, vehicles, or workplaces. Such
surveillance activities capture data in real-time and employ techniques that
intrude into private spaces or capture the contents of private communications.
These modes of surveillance stand in contradistinction to government powers
that empower agencies to retrieve data in ‘‘stored” format, after it has been saved
in either a digital or physical form. Criminal Codes have historically established
the highest degrees of privacy protection around live real-time electronic
31

32

33

34
35

Archon Fung et al., Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Fung et al., Full Disclosure].
Kevin D. Haggerty & Mina Samatas, ‘‘Introduction: Surveillance and Democracy: An
Unsettled Relationship” in Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas, eds., Surveillance and
Democracy (Canada: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010).
Jürgen Habermas, ‘‘On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy”
in Jürgen Habermas, ed., The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998) 253 [Habermas, ‘‘Internal Relation”]; Christopher
Parsons, ‘‘Beyond Privacy: Articulating the Broader Harms of Pervasive Mass
Surveillance” (2015) 3:3 Media and Communication 1.
Bovens, ‘‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability”, supra note 25 at 464.
Habermas, ‘‘Internal Relation”, supra note 33 at 253; Jürgen Habermas, ‘‘Three
Normative Models of Democracy” in Jürgen Habermas, ed., The Inclusion of the Other:
Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998) 239.
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surveillance, on the basis that secretive monitoring of live communications or
activities is deeply revealing of private life.36 In contrast, other ways of collecting
data about a person or their communications are regularly afforded lower
privacy protections, and include the collection of technical details surrounding
those communications such as routing information, times of communications, or
identifiers of the tools used to communicate (so-called ‘‘metadata”), or accessing
data that is stored by third-parties such as email on a private companies’
computer servers.37 In the United States, the National Commission argued in
1976 that ‘‘wiretaps and eavesdrops are potentially more penetrating, less
discriminating, and less visible than ordinary searches” and thus recommended a
stringent process for prior judicial authorization be met before law enforcement
or security agencies be allowed to engage in such surveillance. 38 This logic was
adopted by the Canadian government when it established its own accountability
and oversight regimes concerning electronic surveillance. 39
Warrants are typically required before a Canadian government agency may
conduct real-time electronic interception of communications. 40 Electronic
surveillance warrants provide a control-based mode of accountability by
adding a check to the government’s actions. Before authorities can take action,
36

37

38

39

40

Landau, Surveillance or Security?, supra note 1; Christopher Parsons and Tamir Israel,
‘‘Gone Opaque? An Analysis of Hypothetical IMSI Catcher Overuse in Canada”,
Citizen Lab — Telecom Transparency Project // CIPPIC (August 2016), online:
<https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/20160818-Report-Gone_Opaque.pdf> [Parsons and Israel, ‘‘Gone Opaque?”].
The diminished expectations of privacy associated with stored data and metadata are
highly contentious in academic literature and have been successfully challenged in
Canadian courts (see R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, 2013 CarswellOnt
3216, 2013 CarswellOnt 3217; R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014
CarswellSask 343). See Government of Canada, ‘‘Guidelines for Agents and Peace
Officers Designated by the Minister of Public Safety Canada (PS)” Public Safety Canada
(December 2015), online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/gdlnsgnts-pc-ffcrs/index-en.aspx> [Government of Canada, ‘‘Guidelines for Agents and
Peace Officers”]; Parsons, ‘‘The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance”,
supra note 7; Parsons & Israel, ‘‘Gone Opaque?”, supra note 36; Schwartz, ‘‘Reviving
Telecommunications”, supra note 7; Soghoian, ‘‘Surveillance Reporting Gap”, supra
note 7.
United States, National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws relating
to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Surveillance (Washington:
United States Government, 1976).
Koutros and Demers, ‘‘Big Brother’s Shadow”, supra note 3; Canada, Law Reform
Commission of Canada, ‘‘Electronic Surveillance” (1986) Working Paper No. 47;
Morris Manning, Wiretap Law in Canada: A Supplement to the Protection of Privacy Act,
Bill C-176: An Analysis and Commentary (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978).
Government agencies can sometimes use emergency provisions to quickly initiate a realtime interception. Agencies that use these powers must provide notice to those targeted
by such interceptions within 90 days, annually report on the regularity at which such
emergency interceptions are conducted, and only use these emergency powers in relation
to investigating criminal activities in s. 183 of Canada’s Criminal Code.
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the operation must be approved by a forum. Specifically, in the case of real-time
electronic surveillance government agencies must typically convince a judge as
well as a Minister that they have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that
the real-time surveillance is necessary to conduct an investigation, that affected
persons are identified as best as possible, and that all places in which the
interception will take place have been disclosed.41 Affiants requesting the
warrant must also include whether surreptitious entry to a private space is
required (e.g., to place a bug or video camera in a residence) as well as describe
how they will limit their activities to protect the privacy of uninvolved persons. 42
Only once the judge is satisfied with the information provided, and authorities
have clarified any questions posed or ambiguity detected by the judge, is the
requesting authority authorized to initiate the surveillance.
While judicial authorization functions as a control-based means of
accountability, insofar as a judge can refuse to grant an interception order, the
Protection of Privacy Act also requires provincial and federal governments to
prepare and table annual reports concerning their agencies’ use of electronic
surveillance. As a review-based mechanism, these reports include information
such as the total number of requests for interceptions made, and granted, the
type of investigative method used, such as telephonic versus microphonic versus
video interceptions, and the regularity at which interception-derived evidence is
introduced into courts and used to secure convictions.43
These reports facilitate vertical accountability within the government, and
between the government and legislators, in at least two ways. First, in preparing
these reports the different federal or provincial agencies demonstrate
accountability to their respective Minister in the Westminster tradition.
Ministers assume responsibility for what their agencies do and also provide
direction and control over their behaviours.44 Second, when these reports are
presented to the appropriate legislative assembly, legislators are subsequently
expected to be able to answer basic questions such as whether surveillance
capabilities were being used effectively and whether they were affecting
disproportionate numbers of people.45 If such questions cannot be answered
with the provided information then legislators can challenge the government to
answer those queries. Ultimately, the information in these annual reports is
needed for legislators to determine ‘‘whether the government is judiciously
41

42
43
44

45

Koutros and Demers, ‘‘Big Brother’s Shadow”, supra note 3; Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46, ss. 184-186 [Criminal Code].
Government of Canada, ‘‘Guidelines for Agents and Peace Officers”, supra note 37.
Criminal Code, supra note 41, s. 195.
Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kaare Strm, ‘‘Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation” in Kaare Strm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbj—rn Bergman, eds.,
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003) 55.
Schwartz, ‘‘Reviving Telecommunications”, supra note 7.
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exercising its surveillance powers, whether the exercised powers are effectively
addressing social ills, or whether the powers and their associated practices
represent a good investment of taxpayer money.”46
Thus, on the one hand legislators can exercise their vertical accountability by
holding the government to account for any impropriety in how the reports have
been provided or to raise questions about anomalous statistics. On the other
hand, parties external to government can engage in horizontal accountability
measures if they find the reported information deficient, either in explaining the
statistical reporting provided by government or because there are other
anomalies in how the information is presented. Horizontal accountability,
however, lacks the formal mechanisms to sanction governments for issuing
deficient, incorrect, or tardy reports. The degree of ‘‘accountability” imposed on
the government, then, tends to be normative as opposed to lawfully compelled
because it relies solely on critical evaluation of government activities as
represented in the reports, as well as the activities that underpin the reports,
within a voluntary forum of public debate. The disciplining activities undertaken
when engaging in horizontal accountability bear a strong resemblance to the
disciplining activities which are taken towards both public and private
organizations which release data in the service of being ‘‘transparent” around
an issue of public concern. Such transparency efforts collate and disclose
information to create a ‘‘flow of information” to those outside the organization
that generates it.47 Such projects are designed to either operate as ‘‘a form of
verifiability” or a kind of performance48 to provide ‘‘information on matters of
public concern.”49
The mere act of issuing an annual report constitutes a first-step towards
accountability given that published reports can potentially be scrutinized by a
social forum. While a requirement exists to submit annual electronic surveillance
reports to Canadian legislative assemblies, there is no obligation to provide these
reports to civil society in an accessible format. Documents tabled or presented in
legislative assemblies may be challenging or impossible to access without
physically travelling to legislative libraries. The result is that while such
documents may be ‘‘public”, they are not always accessible to parties external
to the government itself. Furthermore, there is no absolute requirement for civil
society to take up, evaluate, scrutinize, or question reports provided by the
government, which parallels how such stakeholders may be inattentive to
46
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information released through transparency projects by either private firms or
government.50 Specifically, ‘‘the crowdsourcing enabled by transparency is not
evenhanded, unbiased, consistent, or itself accountable. The ‘‘crowd” that
watches consist of those who are intensely interested in whatever is being
watched and often shares a certain perspective. The crowd also tends to be
episodic in its coverage.”51 This does not mean that civil society’s horizontal
accountability or its attention to transparency projects are without merit.
Experience has shown that applying either moral or political suasion to an
organization can subsequently modify its behaviour. 52 Ultimately however,
absent an ability to legally challenge a government’s accountability reporting or
release of public data, civil society is limited in its ability to informally compel
changes in government activity.

II. METHODOLOGY
To analyze the annual electronic surveillance reports tabled by Canada’s
federal and provincial governments, we first attempted to access the reports from
governmental websites in July 2015. We found publicly available reports online
from the federal government, as well as the governments of Alberta, Nova
Scotia, and Quebec. When unable to find such publicly available reports we sent
a standard form request (Appendix 1) to all other provinces’ and territories’
respective Justice departments, when there was a public method of contacting
them, or to a general government inquiry email or communications email address
when there was no clear way to directly contact the relevant government’s Justice
department. The standard form request asked for all electronic surveillance
reports, prepared by the respective governments’ solicitor general, for the years
2005-2014. Given that requests were sent in mid-2015, the most current reports
that were available at the time were expected to be from 2014. The governments
of British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario provided copies of
reports following these requests. Non-responsive provinces and territories
included: Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Saskatchewan, Yukon,
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. It was only following an inquiry from a
colleague in the media in late 2017 that Newfoundland, Saskatchewan, Nunavut
and Yukon replied. The two provinces provided links into their online-accessible
Hansards, from which we were able to find many of their annual electronic
50
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surveillance reports. Nunavut and Yukon, in contrast, asserted that its electronic
surveillance statistics are included in the federal government’s reports and thus
the respective governments do not produce territory-specific reports.
All documents were provided in .pdf format. A spreadsheet was created to
tabulate data contained in the reports. A generic spreadsheet format was created
per the requirements for reporting that are established in the Criminal Code, with
modifications to the template made on a per-province basis if there was deviation
from the mandated format. Baseline categories included:
.
.
.
.
.
.

total number of authorizations and numbers of times they were renewed;
general description of the ways in which communications are intercepted;
type of offences related to surveillance authorizations;
the number of times evidence from interceptions was adduced in criminal
proceedings;
the number of times evidence from interceptions resulted in convictions;
the number of notifications issued to targets of surveillance.

Our data set represents the most recently available data from the reports we
gathered. Alberta, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Manitoba,
Quebec, and Saskatchewan release information specific to each year of the
document (i.e. all information pertaining to interceptions in a given year are
captured in the following year’s report). All other governments similarly release
data on an annual basis, but include updates to previously published annual
reports (i.e. a report tabled in 2014 about interception activities undertaken in
2013 might also update statistics concerning interceptions carried out in 2007).
As we will discuss, these updates raise questions about how reports should be
evaluated by legislators and stakeholders external to government alike.

III. DATA
(a) Tabling of Reports
Governments must annually table their electronic surveillance reports to
their respective legislative assemblies.53 The reports we obtained for British
Columbia, New Brunswick, and Ontario lacked publication dates, thus
preventing us from determining when they were tabled.
Federal government reports were generally tabled in Parliament annually,
though the 2014 and 2015 reports were both released in 2016 and the 2008 report
was tabled after the 2009 report. Alberta generally published its reports each
year, save for the 2012 and 2013 years, which were published in 2014 and 2015,
respectively. Manitoba’s annual reports are irregularly published; the 2005 and
2006 reports were both tabled in 2007, the 2008 and 2009 reports both in 2010,
and the 2012 and 2013 reports both in 2014. We were not able to obtain a report
for 2011. We were unable to find several of Newfoundland’s reports, inclusive of
53
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2010-2012, though otherwise the province issued annual reports. Nova Scotia’s
reports were tabled annually for 2005-2008, whereas there was a bulk publication
of annual reports for 2009-2013 on March 18, 2015. Quebec’s reports were the
least regularly tabled, with the 2005 and 2006 reports being tabled in 2006, the
2006-2007 reports tabled in 2014, and 2008-2014 reports all being tabled in June
2016 following the Quebec government calling an inquiry into police surveillance
of journalists.54 Saskatchewan’s reports were generally tabled each year, though
we were unable to locate the report for 2010.

(b) Accessibility of Reports to the Public
Some governments made their annual reports accessible to the public online,
which meant that we could easily access and download reports from the
governments of Canada, Alberta, and Nova Scotia. While Quebec’s reports were
online as well, reports tended to be published in batches; when we first collected
reports in mid-2015 we could only download reports until 2005. Reports from
Newfoundland and Saskatchewan were available online through their respective
Gazettes, but the available public search functions on the governments’ own
websites were unable to find the reports. Moreover, the Saskatchewan reports do
not cite the law which requires the province to issue these annual reports and title
these sections of their Gazette as ‘‘Criminal Code (Canada)”. Combined, these
limitations significantly impeded the accessibility of the reports from
Newfoundland and Saskatchewan.
We did not receive the same responses from all provinces when we requested
copies of their annual reports. A government official in Quebec informed us that
reports from 2005-2014 would be provided once the individual responsible for
them returned from vacation. No reports were ever provided by that individual,
though reports for 2005-2015 were published online in February 2017 following
scandals that Quebec police had been conducting electronic surveillance of
journalists.55 In contrast, the governments of British Columbia, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, and Ontario responded to our requests for copies of their annual
reports. The government official in British Columbia initially stated they did not
produce annual reports and only found and provided them upon further
questioning.56 The Manitoba Queen’s Printer was able to provide reports for
2005-2012, with the exception of 2011, as a copy could not be found. The New
Brunswick government compiled and provided copies of its annual reports
within five days. The Ontario government provided the reports two months after
the initial request. There were no responses to our requests from the governments
of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Yukon, Northwest
54
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Territories, or Nunavut. Information we collected concerning Newfoundland,
Saskatchewan, Yukon, and Nunavut only came after a media colleague
contacted the respective governments in late 2017.

(c) Formatting of Reports
After collating the reports, we evaluated them for similarities and differences
in the categories used to report practices of electronic surveillance.

(i) Variations in “Interception by Method” Across Jurisdiction
Provinces and the federal government of Canada report on the methods of
interception differently. Some, such as the Federal government, Alberta,
Manitoba, and Nova Scotia, report on the modes of interception as involving
‘‘Telecommunications”, ‘‘Microphone”, ‘‘Video”, or ‘‘Other”. British Columbia
included these same four categories, as well as three additional categories:
‘‘tracking”, ‘‘cellular/payphone”, and ‘‘Internet”. However, these supplemental
categories in the BC reports appeared in different years. Ontario listed
‘‘Telecommunications and Other” and ‘‘Room Probes and Body Pack” (each
for years 2005-2011), and included a further breakdown in methods for certain
years, noting a difference between ‘‘Telephone” (only for years 2008-2011) and
‘‘Cell Phone” (only for years 2008-2011). Saskatchewan has added and
subtracted from its list of interception methods; while ‘‘telecommunications”
and ‘‘microphone” are present in many reports, other categories are added and
sometimes removed from reports, including ‘‘video”, ‘‘cell phone”, ‘‘other”,
‘‘tracking device”, and ‘‘body pack”. Newfoundland did not report on the
number of times that different kinds of electronic surveillance methods were
used, but updated its kinds of methods of surveillance during the years we
examined. ‘‘Telecommunications” and ‘‘oral communications” remained a
constant kind of interception method across reports, with ‘‘video” and
‘‘Internet” added in the 2007 report.
Quebec is noteworthy for the number of classifications of interception it
provides in reports over the years. The province’s reports list
‘‘telecommunications” and then uniquely display methods of ‘‘video”,
‘‘microphone”, and ‘‘other” compared with other jurisdictions. For instance,
Quebec includes categories such as ‘‘audio device installed in a place” (for years
2004-2014), ‘‘video device installed in a place” (for years 2004-2014), ‘‘audio
device installed on person” (for years 2004-2014), ‘‘video device installed on
person” (for years 2004-2014), ‘‘computer data” (2008-2014), and ‘‘other”
(appearing in 2013-2014, but showing zero). Faxes were also included as
categories in 2013 and 2014. Quebec also included categories for ‘‘audio video
device installed on person” (2001-2003) and ‘‘audio video device installed in
place” (2001-2003). ‘‘Other (fax machine)” (2001-2003), and ‘‘Other (computer
data)” (2001-2004) also appeared.
New Brunswick does not include a section for data on interception methods.
Instead, Section K of the report includes ‘‘A general description of the methods
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of interception involved in each interception under an authorization”. This
section lists ‘‘Electromagnetic, Acoustic, Mechanical, or Other Devices (‘‘bugs”
in dwellings or other locations, and telephone interceptions)” each year.

(ii) Variations in Reporting Historical Information
While some jurisdictions provide information about prior years’ interception
reports in each new report, not all do so and not all report on historical data in
the same way. While the Federal government and government of British
Columbia include historical information, their reports showcase inconsistencies
between years, including around the regularity with which interception-related
information is adduced as evidence and is used to lead to convictions. For
instance, some federal reports indicate that while evidence was adduced in one
year, later years showcase a reduction in the number of times in which
interception data is adduced into evidence. As an example, the 2012 annual
report tabled by the Federal government stated that interception-related evidence
was adduced in 659 times, but the government’s 2014 annual report revealed that
the 2012 numbers were revised downward to 537. Similarly, British Columbia’s
reports also had downward revisions. The province’s annual report issued in
2011 showed that there were only two convictions in 2010, but the 2014 report
shows that there were in fact no convictions in 2010. Moreover, in the 2013
report, the number of convictions in 2005 states nine, but the 2014 report revised
these convictions downwards.
In comparison to the British Columbia and Federal governments, the
governments of Alberta, Quebec, Manitoba, Newfoundland, New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan only offer statistics from that single
year of the report. Consequently, they do not provide revisions to the frequency
at which the evidence is adduced, or conviction rates. Nova Scotia, in particular,
does not include a separate category of ‘‘adduced as evidence” or ‘‘resulting in
conviction”. Instead, they include a section termed ‘‘adduced and resulted in
conviction”. Similarly, Newfoundland’s reports did not indicate whether
interception-related information was used as evidence or used to secure a
conviction. And lastly, while Ontario offers an update in the data for
authorizations, they do not do so for convictions.

(iii) Other Conflations in Categories
A small number of other discrepancies emerged in the formatting of the
documents. In Ontario and Newfoundland, the number of authorizations
specific to the type of warrant was unavailable. Instead, these provinces only
provide the number of authorizations, leaving a reader uncertain as to whether a
report refers to overall total authorizations or authorizations specific to videowarrants. Compared with other jurisdictions such as Alberta, which break down
the figures specific to other warrants such as ‘‘audio”, ‘‘video”, ‘‘emergency
audio”, and ‘‘emergency video”, it is difficult to derive accuracy from the Ontario
or Newfoundland figures. There were also discrepancies in how provinces
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displayed their backdated data. For instance, the Federal government reports
show previous years in consecutive fashion (i.e. the 2010 report included
information pertaining to 2009, 2008, 2007 and 2006). However, British
Columbia did not always display previous year’s data in a linear format (i.e.
British Columbia’s 2010 report displayed data for the years 2010, 2009, and 2002,
while their 2014 report showed data for the years 2014, 2013, and 2007). The
rationale for these differences is not indicated in the report. Furthermore, while
New Brunswick (in years 2012, 2013, and 2014) stated that ‘‘there have been no
authorizations issued in New Brunswick as a result of application”, the
government did not display any data on how many applications were made or
what type of applications they were, which would otherwise be available at that
time. Information on number and type of application was reflected in other
jurisdictions. And lastly, federal reports were the only ones that visualized the
data in graphs.

(iv) Variations in Narrative Assessments
Narrative assessments are included in electronic surveillance reports to
contextualize the activities undertaken in a given year, challenges that may have
been experienced in conducting interceptions, or relative importance of electronic
surveillance methods. Past research found that Federal government electronic
surveillance reports did not meaningfully change the assessments on an annual
basis; the reports used practically the same language each year and thus did not
enhance a readers’ understanding of the context in which electronic surveillance
is conducted. 57 Based on analysis conducted by Koutros and Demers, the last
substantive narrative assessment of the federal government’s electronic
surveillance appeared in the 1995 annual report.58
Using 2005 reports as a baseline, we examined the extent to which different
provinces modified the text in their narrative assessments. Alberta used the same
language from 2005 to 2009, and then ceased including narrative assessments
from 2010-2013. British Columbia used the same narrative language from 20052014. Manitoba’s reports revealed the number of charges, pleas, and times
interception data was introduced into courts but did not provide a narrative
assessment of the actual value, importance, or challenges linked with electronic
surveillance. New Brunswick used the same language for 2005-2011, in which
electronic surveillance interceptions were conducted. There were no assessments
for 2012-2014, nor were there interceptions conducted in those years. Nova
Scotia did not include a narrative assessment of the value of, or challenges facing,
electronic assessments in the 2005-2014 reports. Ontario showed small updates –
in 2008 a paragraph was added about the importance of interceptions – but the
narrative assessment text was largely reused each year, to the point where the
2010 electronic surveillance report did not change the date from 2009 to 2010 in
57
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the assessment paragraphs. Quebec’s electronic surveillance reports showed two
dominant templates – one from 2005 and the other from 2006 – that was
incrementally updated and largely reused from one year to the next. Neither
Newfoundland nor Saskatchewan included narrative assessments in their
reports. Overall, reading these annual narrative assessments did not provide
information concerning the specific importance of interceptions, or note that new
communications technologies were impeding the efficacy of electronic
surveillance, nor that additional interception capacity was needed for
government agencies to conduct their investigations.

IV. DISCUSSION
The presentation of annual electronic surveillance reports is mandated by the
Criminal Code, but despite requirements that annual reports be issued, our
research has found that many governments are only intermittently compliant.
Further, the law as written at the time of this article’s publication does not
require governments to make these annual reports easily accessible to the public.
As a result, while there is no primary gap, as the law requires issuing reports to
legislative assemblies, a gap nevertheless exists insofar as the law lacks any
formal requirement to ensure that extra-governmental forums can access,
analyze, and critique the information provided by government. To put it another
way, the law as written establishes the basis upon which vertical accountability
can be imposed upon ministers, but does not include an explicit process to
facilitate horizontal accountability regimes.
Despite a legislative mandate to issue annual reports, there are numerous
secondary accountability gaps that weaken or undercut both the vertical and
horizontal accountability regimes associated with electronic surveillance in
Canada. First and foremost, there are cases where governments have declined or
failed to table the annual reports as required under the law. In doing so,
legislative assemblies as well as external stakeholders have been prevented from
examining the activities undertaken by the government, evaluating the efficacy of
the activities undertaken, and understanding the rationale for such activities in
the investigation of serious criminal offences in Canada.
Second, tabled reports showcase significant variations with regards to how
different types of electronic surveillance are reported. While some provinces
provided broad categories (i.e. telecommunications, video, audio, ‘‘other”)
others specifically described the target system as mobile phones, internet
communications, body cameras, or facsimile communications. Reports that were
more specific than others are likely to provide legislators with greater insight into
the activities that were being undertaken, and thus allow them to better
appreciate the ways in which electronic surveillance is being transformed by the
application of old laws to new modes of surveillance. By contrast, categories such
as telecommunications, video, audio, and ‘‘other” tend to mask how established
laws are being used in modern practice.59 Though governments are permitted
under the law to provide non-standardized descriptions of the kinds of electronic
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surveillance they are involved in, this lack of standardization makes it
challenging to compare surveillance reports issued by one government against
the reports of another. The result is that neither legislators nor external
stakeholders, nor even the courts approving the surveillance, can confidently
understand how government agencies exercise their lawful interception and
electronic surveillance powers. Agencies can adopt new technologies for
electronic surveillance practices and still not be required to disclose to
members of Parliament or to the public the ways that laws have been
interpreted to authorize new lines of technical investigation.
Moreover, the challenges in analyzing reports is difficult even within a single
jurisdiction. Along with the federal government, some of the provincial
governments provide periodic updates to their annual statistics. In some cases,
this involves adjusting up or down the total number of times that there were
authorizations for electronic surveillance (e.g. shifting from 421 times to 433
times) whereas in others there is only a number beside the ‘‘new” number of
authorizations (e.g. in a 2013 report there might have been seven authorizations
whereas the 2014 report indicates there was one additional authorization, but not
the new total of having been eight authorizations). Further, when governments
provide updates to past interception reports that were issued many years
previously it gives rise to questions about the ability of law enforcement agencies
to accurately count the number of authorizations they receive and lawfully
monitor their effectiveness. In tandem, the inability of law enforcement bodies to
carry out these reporting functions negatively affects the abilities of legislators
and external stakeholders to evaluate and trust information submitted by
government. Updating statistics years after the required tabling of the annual
report undermines informed debate by raising doubt over the veracity of the
tabled reports.
The aforementioned secondary gaps – namely in the regularity at which
reports are tabled, the differences in how provinces categorize surveillance
methods, and updates to past reports – could be at least somewhat remedied if
governments included meaningful narratives alongside reported data. For
instance, those narratives should include information about why the kinds of
surveillance undertaken are important. They should also describe how such
surveillance activities are used to advance investigations and prosecutions,
explain failures to annually table reports, and clarify to readers why particular
models were adopted to update past reports. Moreover, given the regularity with
which government agencies discuss the limitations of being able to intercept
communications,60 decry the extent to which encryption stymies investigations as
a justification for new interception,61 and call for other lawful access powers,62
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the narrative sections of reports could place evidence regarding these stated
issues before the legislative assembly and to the citizenry itself more widely. But
this is not how reports are tabled. Instead, when narrative descriptions are
included at all, they largely recycle the text of past years, thus providing no
meaningful information to legislators tasked with holding agencies vis-à-vis their
Ministers to account, nor to external stakeholders who might also hold the
government to account in the public sphere.
Vertical accountability is predicated on the presence of clear laws which
establish how an actor presents information to a forum, along with a clear set of
sanctions in place should the actor fail to render themselves accountable in the
manner prescribed by law. Such information is used to correct an information
asymmetry between the government and legislators, so that legislators can
subsequently issue sanctions as appropriate. But when actors can retroactively
update reports intended to demonstrate their accountability to legislative
assemblies without explanations, when no apparent consequences exist for
failing to provide more than a general explanation of how invasive powers are
used, or where boilerplate language is deployed to justify the necessity of
electronic surveillance for criminal investigations, then the ability for legislators
to hold the government to account is limited. The information provided grants
only a partial correction to the information asymmetry. In parliamentary
government systems, there are dedicated critics of different government
departments, but the delayed, retroactively-updated, and boiler-plated
language in the reports suggests that either governments are non-responsive to
critics or that critics lack a capacity to identify and call attention to limitations in
the electronic surveillance reports which, in turn, facilitates inconsistent and
unhelpful reporting.
Horizontal accountability practices, where external stakeholders examine
information released by the government for the purposes of providing normative
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feedback concerning the information’s contents, similarly depend on the release
of reliable information in the first place. Without a formal mechanism for
external stakeholders to sanction the government, and with a dependence on
other stakeholders (such as the media or sympathetic members of a legislative
assembly) to place pressure on the government, any failure to release information
exacerbates a profound information asymmetry.63 External stakeholders often
‘‘crowdsource” analysis and critique, insofar as different stakeholders will focus
on different governments’ reports, often based on their geographic interests (e.g.
British Columbia actors focus on reports pursuant to the provincial
government’s reports, whereas Ontario actors focus on the Ontario-related
information). However, these stakeholders may not find it worthwhile to
examine released information that is produced by either corporate or
government actors if that information is insufficiently useful to be taken up
into organizational practices. Without regularly issued reports, which adhere to
standardized data requirements, being released with the intention of furthering
particular policy goals, and which hold value for external stakeholders, there is a
reduced likelihood that external parties will devote limited resources to ingest,
analyze, and use data provided by the government.64 Without this kind of use,
the parties invested in horizontal accountability can neither serve to legitimize
government practices or actively work to improve upon deficient or questionable
ones.65
Over time, a combined inability or difficulty for legislators to engage in
vertical accountability and for external stakeholders to engage in horizontal
accountability raises the prospect of an accountability failure. Policy programs
can be said to ‘‘fail” when they do not achieve what they were originally designed
to do.66 Given that the objective of annual electronic surveillance reports is to
establish internal-to-government accountability through agency reporting to
Ministers, as well as Ministerial accountability to their respective legislatures,
accountability is not possible when there are chronic failures in data collection,
tabulation, and issuance to the legislative bodies. These chronic issues are
expressed, in part, through failures to regularly table reports, to consistently
format reports, or to clarify why reporting matters in the context of agencies’
surveillance activities. Given these factors, the policy driving the release of these
reports is ostensibly failing in its desired outcomes.
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To compound this problem, program failure in surveillance accountability
regimes can be masked by what might simultaneously appear as a political
success. While our account of electronic surveillance reports indicates chronic
gaps and breakdowns in establishing conditions for accountability, the mere
existence of a lawful requirement for vertical accountability can enhance the
reputations of officials tasked with ensuring legitimacy of the programs. The
presence of laws, which compel annual reports, projects a symbolic veneer of
‘formalised accountability’. One the one hand this veneer presents an
authoritative view of government dutifully fulfilling their regulatory role under
liberal democratic arrangements while, on the other, there is a failure to
meaningfully provide information that is a pre-requisite for the forms of
accountability discussed in this article. Even in the most thoroughly detailed and
regularly issued reports amongst our sample, the Federal reports, the statistics
include a compilation of electronic surveillance that is conducted in the Canadian
territories as well as by federal agencies across Canada more broadly. None of
the reports, however, reveal this aggregation. Given that these reports are
intended to provide a meaningful reflection of the surveillance activities of
authorities, their current presentation prevents Canadians and persons studying
the reports from understanding specifically where surveillance geographically
takes place and, as such, inhibits the ability of federal and territorial legislators to
understand the actual targeting of federal surveillance measures. The current
arrangement of reporting on electronic surveillance threatens to create a
misguided belief that existing institutions are both the most appropriate parties
to conduct surveillance oversight and review, and that they are actually
conducting such oversight and review. Most problematically, it does so largely
vis-à-vis a democratically passed law which establishes a process of review but
does not mandate the substance which would actually ensure that the review is
undertaken seriously. In short, it presents a veneer of review without
supplementing it with the substance of review.
The production of the annual electronic surveillance reports demonstrates
governmental commitment to lawfulness, but lawfulness itself can operate as a
deceptive yardstick for evaluating state practices designed to review lawful
surveillance activities. Compliance with review requirements can be taken by
government as a way of appearing to safeguard democratic liberties while
actually doing little to inhibit surveillance and instead supporting its exercise. 67
Accountability reporting may similarly suffer when it is used to symbolize
accountability and oversight — and thus a demonstration of liberal democratic
norms in practice — while failing to substantively provide the accountability and
oversight which is practically required to hold government to account for its
67
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exercise of state surveillance within a liberal democratic structure of
government.68 If the conditions for accountability are not being met in
surveillance reports, as demonstrated in this article, the legislatively mandated
‘act of reporting’ might be more accurately described as a superficial or
incomplete gesture of democratic safeguarding at the expense of a program that
might otherwise more deeply inform the democratic process.
The deficiencies we have identified in the course of this research are neither
necessary nor inevitable. Members of the government, legislators, and external
stakeholders could undertake deliberate and collaborative efforts to close
existing gaps and preclude future failures. To begin, the annual electronic
surveillance reports are intended to help legislators understand the types,
reasons, and efficacy of government surveillance but, as it stands today,
comparing reports across jurisdictions is challenging at best. The federal
government, working with its provincial counterparts, could take the lead to
reform its own reporting systems as well as create a central repository that
collates all Canadian governments’ statistics and presents them alongside one
another. Doing so would assist legislators in each jurisdiction to better
understand how the activities of their own policing forces operate as compared
to those in other jurisdictions, while clarifying whether increases or decreases in
annual electronic surveillance warrants and interceptions were in line with
national fluctuations. Regardless of whether the federal government was so
tasked with aggregating reports from across Canada, legislation pertaining to the
reports might be amended to require all policing bodies to affirmatively state the
number of interception authorizations they requested each year. This would
compel bodies to state that they had or had not sought such an authorization,
and could eliminate existing confusions that emerge from provinces and the
federal government modifying old reports to indicate a greater or lesser number
of authorizations having been sought in a given year.
As discussed, governments of Canada include differing degrees of detail
about the kinds of electronic surveillance which are carried out in any given year.
Though the granularity provided by some reports does shed some light on the
ways that policing and security agencies are using their lawful powers, the
unevenness in this granularity simultaneously makes it challenging for readers to
effectively compare reports against one another. One path forward would be for
the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials
(Criminal Justice): Cybercrime Working Group (FPT CCSO CWG) to develop
an updated standard for reporting electronic surveillance statistics in a way that
is adopted uniformly across all reporting jurisdictions. The FTP CCSO CWG
has previously worked to develop suggestions pertaining to legislation which
could authorize lawful access to Basic Subscriber Information,69 as well as
recommending ways of combating cyberbullying and the non-consensual
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distribution of intimate images.70 Given its expertise, as well as its ability to
coordinate across all jurisdictions, the group is well situated to review and
evaluate all previously published electronic surveillance reports and subsequently
issue recommendations to the governments for how to amend existing legislation
in order to improve upon current statistical reporting. Their recommendations
could also clarify and establish the kinds of information that must (or should) be
included in narratives accompanying the annual statistics. Narratives might, as
an example, include the number of instances where encryption or other technical
characteristics foiled an attempted method of electronic surveillance, or whether
there are difficulties in compelling private companies to conduct warranted
electronic surveillance when compelled to do so, or other challenges facing law
enforcement and security agencies.
Regardless of whether the federal and provincial governments amend
existing practices to enhance comparability across governments’ annual reports,
there is also an important role for external independent evaluators. For instance,
independent evaluators could examine governments’ past annual reports, and
also be expected to evaluate future reports. Specifically, these independent
evaluators could examine the reports in a very similar fashion as to our own
study in this article, that is, to scrutinize government actions that have led to a
failure to issue reports, or which backdated reports in opaque ways. Information
and privacy commissioners or another independent government auditor, or
private consulting company, could be tasked with undertaking these reviews in
order to ultimately restore trust in the veracity of the reports which were, and
are, tabled by governments.
And finally, regardless of whether annual electronic surveillance reports are
reformed or reviewed by external examiners, the reports ought to be made easily
accessible to the public. Given that electronic surveillance is recognized as
amongst the most intrusive forms of surveillance and, as such, requiring the
highest degrees of oversight, control, and review, it is essential that governments
throughout Canada make these reports easily available to the public so that they
can understand the regularity, rationales, and efficacy of such surveillance.
Without enhancing the public availability of these reports it is dubious that
stakeholders external to government, such as academics, civil society
organizations, or journalists, will be able to regularly compare and write about
the nature and impacts of annually occurring electronic surveillance activities. If
the current status quo persists, the government will not benefit from the policy
insights external stakeholders might offer, such as ways to improve upon existing
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reporting functions or to evaluate the government’s actions as being just and
appropriate and, thus, whether (and what) surveillance activities are legitimately
a public good. Such legitimization is particularly important if citizens are to
recognize their laws as functioning to appropriately secure the safety and security
of society without unduly interfering with basic rights.

V. CONCLUSION
This article examined the extent to which Canadian governments’ annual
electronic surveillance reports can be used by legislators and external
stakeholders alike to hold the government to account. It found that though
there was not a primary gap in vertical accountability, insofar as there are laws
compelling government to release these reports, there were extensive secondary
vertical gaps stemming from failures to issue reports on an annual basis as
required, a lack of standardization across jurisdictions, and a neglect on the part
of governments to provide a narrative justification for the value of interception
and surveillance powers. The same secondary gaps apply where external parties
are engaged in horizontal accountability and are made worse because external
stakeholders have no legal expectation that they can or will receive information
about government electronic surveillance activities in an accessible format, thus
creating a primary gap in horizontal accountability. When these issues are
chronic, a policy gap can become a policy failure, insofar as the exceptions to the
rule threaten to swallow the rule itself. We argue that such failures are manifest
in the tabling, presentation, and explanation of the electronic surveillance reports
studied. Unless these deficiencies are corrected, accountability reporting as a
public policy instrument threatens to advance a veneer of political legitimacy at
the expense of maintaining fulsome democratic safeguards designed to secure the
freedoms associated with liberal democratic political systems. By adopting a
range of policies such as updated statistical reporting models, aggregated
statistics to support comparisons, enhanced narrative discussions in reports, or
even just making the reports easily accessible to external stakeholders, the
existing reporting instruments can be strengthened and used to enhance
democratic values. However, the ongoing unwillingness or failure to more
meaningfully account for government’s use of electronic surveillance, however,
may indicate the triumph of veneer over substance.
Future work in this area can focus on whether governments that declined to
respond to our inquiries for their annual reports simply failed to respond to us,
or instead did not table the reports in their respective legislatures at all. This
might involve visiting libraries that hold different provinces’ and territories’
Hansards, or other government archives. Work could also include small-scale
interviews with current and past legislators to understand whether these reports
have ever been sought internally or used to hold government to account. Such
work would clarify whether ongoing weaknesses in the reports, which lead to
vertical and horizontal accountability gaps, are the result of legislators failing to
use the reports, or rather the government’s failure to modify them in response to
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comments from legislators. Similar types of interviews could be done with
members of civil society and the media to understand whether they have relied on
the annual reports in their efforts to hold governments to account for their use of
electronic surveillance. Another line of research into government surveillance
accountability mechanisms might follow our prior work that attempted to
understand and encourage private companies to disclose how, how often, and on
what basis they disclose information to law enforcement and domestic security
organizations.71 Specifically, by working with legislators, publishing public
letters, issuing Access to Information and Privacy requests, as well as other
methods, we could encourage governments to evaluate the ease of, or possibility
of, reforms into how governments report on the shifting technological dynamics
of electronic surveillance. This approach would test the extent to which
horizontal accountability might prompt change in government surveillance
reporting behaviours.
Where annual accountability reporting is done irregularly, when there are
challenges that inhibit understanding of the reported information or comparison
across jurisdictions, and where the value of intrusive government actions is not
explained clearly, accountability reporting has the potential to distort, extend,
and distend information.72 Similar to corporate reports that are meant to correct
information asymmetries between firms and external stakeholders,
accountability reports issued by government are unlikely to ‘‘correct
information asymmetries, promote intended policy changes, or lead to
alterations of behavior.”73 Given the number of proposals, especially following
the revelations of Edward Snowden, for reforming surveillance legislation to
clarify what constitutes democratically legitimated surveillance activities and
make more apparent how often, and for what reasons and to what effects,
foreign and domestic surveillance is undertaken, it behooves the academic
community to understand the existing mandatory reporting systems in order to
ensure that any new systems improve upon what exists today, as opposed to
repeating mistakes of yore.
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APPENDIX 1
Request for Provincial Electronic Surveillance Reports
SUBJECT: Request for Annual reports on use of electronic surveillance
To Whom It May Concern,
I am an academic researcher at the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global
Affairs at the University of Toronto.
I would like to request copies of your province’s Annual reports on the use of
electronic surveillance, for the years 2005 to 2014. These reports are produced
annually per section 195 of the Criminal Code. More information about what
these reports include is available at Public Safety Canada’s website, here:
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/lctrnc-srvllnc-2012/indexeng.aspx >
Could you provide me with copies (preferably electronic versions) of your
province’s reports dating back to 2005?
Best Regards,
Chris

